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Abstract  
 
Regulators such as Turner (2009) have identified excessive securitization, high leverage, 
extensive market trading and a bonus culture, as being major factors in bringing about the 
bank centred financial crisis of 2007-9. The core idea of this paper is, however, that a lack of 
banking knowledge and history amongst bank board directors, top management and regulators 
was also deeply implicated in the crisis and addressing this knowledge gap and its causes will 
be part of the solution to the crisis. The knowledge problems concerned banks’ understanding 
of their organisation, intermediation and risk management in an active market setting and 
during rapid change. Though much was known before the crisis, the failing banks ignored or 
were unaware of this knowledge and also experienced acute difficulties with learning the new 
knowledge needed to address the new problems thrown-up by the financial crisis. The paper 
develops a framework for understanding the role and application of knowledge in banking 
and suggests how banks can institutionalise learning and actively create new knowledge 
through time to improve bank organisation, intermediation, and risk management. This 
knowledge forms the core of a bank’s sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) and it is 
argued that the institutionalisation of banking knowledge ought to constitute an important 
element of any sustainable solution to the problems currently being experienced by the 
banking sector.  By ensuring greater bank learning, knowledge creation, and knowledge use, 
governments and regulators could help reduce individual bank risk and the likelihood of 
future crisis. 
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Banks, Knowledge and Crisis - a case of knowledge and learning failure 
Introduction 
Turner (2009) summarised the reasons that led to the bank centred financial crisis in 2007-
2009,  as  including, massive growth in securitised credit, securities trading, leverage and 
excessive dependence on short-term capital market funding. It seems that both the ratings 
agencies and the “sophisticated” mathematical risk management models seriously under-
estimated  the risks associated with such a strategy and the “bonus culture” and high leverage 
greatly encouraged excessive risk taking by rewarding apparent success (luck) but not 
penalizing failure. However, the core idea of this paper is that knowledge and lack of it was 
also deeply implicated in the crisis and in many of the above problems, and hence addressing 
these issues will be part of the solution.  
 
In section 1 it is demonstrated that much was known long before the crisis about how 
effective bank intermediation and risk management worked, about problems with these 
mechanisms and of previous crises in banking markets. Application of this knowledge alone 
in the failing banks would have significantly reduced the chances of bank failure.  Section 2 
explores how evidence to the UK Treasury select committee in 2009 and other sources 
revealed that much of the available prior knowledge was ignored or its relevance not 
understood at the top of the failing banks during the 2001-07 period. Unsurprisingly, relative 
to the more knowledgeable and cautious banks, their resulting high-risk business models 
proved to be appreciably more vulnerable during the 2008-09 crisis.   
 
Section 3 develops a more general theoretical approach to understanding how banks can 
formally create and manage knowledge in a dynamic process through time to improve 
intermediation and reduce vulnerability.  This conceptual frame is based, in part, on existing 
developments in universal banking (UB) practice (see Holland, 2009), and in part, on 
developments in the literature concerning knowledge as the ‘learning organisation’, 
knowledge management,  ‘intellectual capital’, and theory concerning knowledge based 
competitive advantage.  Working examples of these theoretical ideas are also discussed as 
they are connected to each other and to conventional ideas of bank intermediation and risk 
management functions. Section 4 summarises the paper and, using the conceptual frame 
developed in section 3, argues that, to minimise the chances of future crises, governments and 
banking regulators ought to focus on improving learning, knowledge creation, and knowledge 
use in banking.  
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1. Intermediation and Risk Management Knowledge prior to the 2007 financial crisis 
 
Much was known long before the crisis regarding how bank intermediation and risk 
management worked and about problems with these mechanisms. There was considerable 
knowledge about the risk spreading and sharing capabilities of wholesale markets, and 
general principles of market efficiency. Much was known about the causes and anatomy of 
previous crises in banking markets (Kindleberger, 1996), about the ‘freezing’ of interbank 
markets and about previous problems of ‘toxic’ loans.  Application of this prior knowledge 
would have reduced the chances of bank failure during the 2007-09 crisis. 
 
Knowledge of specialist forms of bank intermediation and of risk management has long been 
available in the literature (Lewis & Davis 1987, Buckle & Thompson, 2004). Retail banks 
intermediaries spread their deposit withdrawal risk and loan risks across liability and asset 
portfolios, and employed cash reserves and 'adequate' equity capital to absorb these residual 
risks. Wholesale banks spread withdrawal risk and bad debt risk by sharing large risks in the 
inter-bank and syndicated loan markets and by transferring this risk to many banks in these 
markets. Investment banks were security based banks that helped companies to design 
security issues, underwrite the risks of the issues, and find purchasers of the equity and bonds.  
 
The three models of specialist banks embodied their own well established intermediation 
mechanisms and methods of risk management.   ‘Commercial’ banks were combinations of 
retail and wholesale banks.  These three forms began to be integrated as ‘Universal’ banks 
(UB) from the 1980s onwards. The bank changes were driven by financial market, regulatory 
and product changes as well as by previous banking crises such as the 3rd world debt 
problems. These boosted direct market transacting, threatened conventional commercial 
banking, and created new opportunities for investment banking (Lewis and Davis 1987, 
p380). Holland (2009) reveals empirical patterns during 1980-2000 in UB  organising, the 
search for knowledge advantage, and major problems in UB development. This research  and 
subsequent problems provided a historic grounding for this paper. In the period 2000 to 2006,  
five large US investment banks became ‘universal’ by being involved in on-balance sheet 
activities, holding securitized assets financed by interbank deposits. Large UK, US and EU 
banks such as Citigroup, Bank of America, Royal Bank, UBS and other banks, with large 
international commercial banking operations intensified their international investment 
banking operations. This development was much encouraged by the effective removal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act in the US in 1999 when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley act was passed. During 
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the 2007-09 crisis the UB developed further with Bear Stearns bought by JP Morgan, Merrill 
Lynch bought by Bank of America, and parts of Lehmans sold to Barclays. The remaining US 
investment banks, such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs became bank holding 
companies and regulated as other large US commercial banks.  
 
Long before the 2007-09 crisis serious problems with the UB model and its implementation 
were, however, apparent. Major joint problems of expansion and integration (Holland, 2009) 
arose in the late 1980s for UK and US banks in their UB development. Conflicts of interest 
arose with clients when corporate managers or their shareholders felt that confidential private 
information was being misused. There were problems managing information flows within the 
combined bank, and of developing of technology and information systems, to identify   group   
risks and profitability of integrated lines of business and customers. Financial market 
problems included, oversupply in some functions notably equity areas, and poor group control 
over the combined investment and commercial bank,  especially with the risk taking culture 
of investment banking arms. In the period 2000-07 as increasingly complex and innovative 
securities were being traded, transactions became difficult for all but the specialists ('rocket 
scientists') to understand. This problem combined with the organisational change involved in 
combining investment and commercial bank functions made it difficult for the combined bank 
group and their managers to closely monitor what bank traders, fund managers, and corporate 
finance advisers were doing or to measure the exposure and risk they created.  Not all UBs 
made mistakes but enough problems emerged to make it clear that in the 25 year period 
before the 2007-09 crisis there was a live experiment as bankers tried to find an effective 
organisational solution to these problems. Thus major knowledge and understanding 
limitations existed when developing the UB model. Banks argued however that their 
problems of survival would have been acute if they had not responded to changes in financial 
markets and in other non bank financial institutions. 
In terms of markets, there was considerable public knowledge about the many previous crises 
in banking in London and elsewhere (Kindleberger, 1996). During 1973-74, in the inter bank 
markets for banks deposits, the markets froze for a period in the ‘secondary’ bank crisis. Reid 
(1982) blamed the crisis on the housing bubble, deregulation, oil prices hikes and the market 
culture of the London banking institutions from the late 1960s. The latter made market 
speculation and crashes almost inevitable. During the syndicated loan markets crisis (1982 to 
1990) international banks faced many problems with their (‘toxic’) syndicated loans. Lewis 
and Davies (1987, p357) argued that both asset and liability sides of bank balance sheet 
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shared the same source of (oil price) risk. In addition, the nature of the lending contract 
whereby interest rate risks were increasingly passed onto borrowers increased the banks 
exposure to default risk as borrower’s cash flow and ability to repay fell sharply. More 
broadly, Kindleberger, (1996) has argued that throughout the past 200 or so years, banking 
crises have been both endemic and remarkably similar in terms of causes and sequencing. 
Typically, a crisis is preceded by an extended period of high optimism and rising asset prices 
and an excessive use of leverage which produces overpriced and volatile asset prices; then 
unforeseen events, combined with the ‘fragility’ of the banking system, precipitate the 
bursting of the bubble, the consequent panic, rush for liquidity and credit squeeze.  
2. Problems of knowledge for banks and bankers during 2007-09 crisis 
 
Evidence to the UK Treasury select committee in 2009 revealed that much of the available 
prior knowledge on organisation, intermediation, markets and risk was ignored in the failing 
banks during the 2001-07 period.  Boards and top management did not learn the lessons of 
prior bank problems (Holland, 2009) and crises (Kindleberger, 1996). Board directors and top 
management  in the failing banks did not understand that their rapid growth models, their  
emphasis on a sales and trading culture, and growth based incentive and pay schemes, all led 
to the development of a very risky UB organisation operating with very risky new products in 
new untested variants of interbank markets. These banks did not appear to understand that 
knowledge about intermediation and risk at the level of employee, middle management, top 
management and the board, was deficient, and this contributed to the failure of their 
intermediation activities, whether informational or financial, or specialised or  universal. The 
failing banks did not understand how retail, wholesale and investment forms of banks worked 
together or created new risks for each other in a UB. They did not understand that the high 
level of risk taken in wholesale and investment banks areas also threatened equity capital 
shared with retail banks.  Bank board directors and top management in failing banks 
prioritised their general knowledge of business strategy over knowledge of organisation, risk, 
intermediation and special function in banking. They appeared to pay at best ‘lip service’ to 
prior knowledge of risk management as they exclusively pursued growth, profits and bonuses. 
Similar problems of misplaced emphasis on mathematical knowledge and idealised theories 
of markets were to be observed at middle management and operational levels (during bank 
lending, valuation processes, market trading etc). This was also a failure of top management 
and their understanding of their business strategies. This was true of those commercial banks 
that went into investment banking operations, and those investment banks that developed on-
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balance sheet assets and liabilities. As the case studies of non-failing banks indicate however 
none of this was inevitable as these banks adopted far more cautious and knowledge-based 
alternative business strategies. 
  
2.1 Bank Board, Top Management 
 
Alistair Darling, the UK Chancellor, argued that the crisis had revealed that bank regulation 
overall had to be ".. more intrusive and needs to ask harder questions". The real problems 
were in boardrooms. "Too many people did not understand the risks to which they were being 
exposed," …"You've got to make sure you've got the right people there to make the right 
judgments.”…."I strongly believe that the process of learning lessons has to start in the 
boardroom. Bank boards must have the right people, skills and experience to manage 
themselves effectively… their focus must be long-term wealth creation, not short-term 
profits." (BBC, Today programme, 17th June 2009) . 
 
In terms of the failing banks, the treasury select committee (January to March 2009) identified 
major knowledge problems at the board level, especially in relation to non-Executive 
Directors.  Key members of these boards and some top management lacked significant prior 
banking experience or professional banking qualifications. Board members were frequently 
very experienced in non bank business domains but did not use that knowledge to good effect 
or adequately monitor bank top management. Typically, board members tended to apply their 
general knowledge of strategy formulation and implementation in non bank businesses to 
banks.   
 
Wheeler (2009) and Clarke (2009) argued that the chairman and NEDs failed in respect of 
their monitoring role of Northern Rock.  This paper argues that this was also a problem of 
knowledge and of misunderstanding concerning the intermediation model adopted and their 
idea of how markets behaved. They did not seem to understand the risks involved when long 
term retail property loans were financed by short term inter bank deposits. They did not 
appear to realise that their low 3rd tier status meant they lost liquidity first in a freeze. The 
knowledge problem was repeated across RBS and HBOS in 2007-08 as stock markets queried 
the level of risk on their balance sheets (intermediation) and in their inter bank market 
positions. In both cases, top management and the board appeared unaware of how extensive 
risk taking in one or two forms of intermediation threatened their much safer form of 
intermediation and the equity shared between these different forms of banking. In RBS this 
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involved major risk taking in joint investment bank and wholesale bank activities which 
threatened a very successful and safe retail bank.  In HBOS this involved major risk taking in 
joint corporate and wholesale bank activities threatening very successful and safe retail and 
mortgage banks. These senior bankers appeared to be unaware that even top tier banks could 
lose their inter bank reputations, positions, capital and liquidity when faced with major 
problems of confidence. 
 
The Treasury Select Committee report on the banking crisis (May 1st, 2009, p40) noted that 
bankers in key banks (and regulators) did not understand how market behaviour hid risk and 
in some cases exacerbated it: 
‘We note that risk and complexity within the banking sector has increased dramatically over 
the last twenty years. The widespread—but at sometimes misguided—belief that risk was 
being dispersed and ‘managed’ led many banks to increase the complexity of their operations 
and their overall risk exposure. This was manifestly a false premise. Indeed one of the factors 
that is key to understanding the banking crisis is that some forms of securitisation, far from 
mitigating risk, actually obscured it.’ 
 
This knowledge problem was largely responsible for the freezing-up of inter bank markets for 
deposits, securitised credit and credit default swaps. This perhaps reflected a larger problem 
with UK boards whereby senior executives and NEDs formed a closed, elite network which 
inhibited board reflection  on issues of social concern, of public confidence and on protecting 
the reputation of the banks with the wider public ( Wheeler 2009, Clarke 2009). These authors 
also pointed to the need to diversify board composition with members outside this elite 
network. As well as reducing the risks associated with groupthink and an excessively narrow 
knowledge base, greater diversity of boards would be likely to raise the status of ‘basic’ retail 
banking and its role in the community.  
 
2.2 Hindsight post crisis 
Problems of knowledge and understanding with bank products 
The following extract from the Treasury Select Committee report (2009, p39, May 1st) 
provides an excellent summary of the main problems of knowledge and lack of understanding 
by board members and top management of the complex derivative products increasingly 
being created and traded by bank employees: Mr Moulton concluded that this lack of 
information and complexity meant “in the case of some of these assets the products are 
simply incapable of being analysed by the vast majority of people out there.”  …..Sir Fred 
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Goodwin told us that securitised products “were knowingly being originated by professionals 
and sold on to professional investors and rated by their agents. The content was 
known”….But other witnesses, such as Dr Danielsson, maintained that the bank bosses did 
not have a firm grasp of what their employees were doing: ‘the individual making things 
complicated is not at the top of the bank, [he] is in the middle of the bank. This is the ‘quant 
guy’ [quantitative trader], the 35-year-old, whatever he is; he creates instruments. His boss 
has no understanding of what he has is doing, the regulator has no understanding of what he 
is doing. All they know is that he is making money from some black box.’ 
 
Problems of knowledge and understanding with bank models 
These problems of knowledge and understanding concerning the UB model created 
conditions whereby many of the problems of the previous 25 years or so were crystallised, 
intensified and implicated in the crisis of 2007-2009.  The problems meant (as in the past) 
parts of the failing banks could engage in very risky activities, without the rest of the bank 
being aware of these risks. The Treasury Select Committee report on the banking crisis (May 
1st, 2009, p40) discovered that board members in the failing banks were highly incentivised 
to focus on ‘growth’ per se. This created a sales rather than a risk management culture  and 
this permeated down the bank hierarchy.   Specialist bank traders in investment or wholesale 
banking and specialist lenders in corporate banking did not have to understand wider bank 
principles of intermediation and risk management, to perform their tasks.  Controls existed in 
terms of caps on transaction and risk levels. However, in the failing banks these employees 
operated in cultures of growth and subjected to strong incentives to boost profits. A sales 
culture dominated rather than a risk management culture at this operational level. Despite this, 
the 2007-09 crisis did not reveal many cases of individual rogue traders as in previous 
individual bank failures.  This crisis was more of a systemic problem of many whole bank 
subsidiaries overtrading (betting whole bank) in markets. This operational culture was driven 
from above via strategies focusing on growth and profits which demonstrated little 
understanding of the risks involved to individual banks and  the overall banking system. 
 
Bankers in the failing banks did not seem to understand that their rapid growth models, with 
their emphasis on sales, trading and incentive pay schemes, all led to the development of a 
very risky variant of the UB model which operated with very risky new products in new 
untested variants of inter-bank markets. Investment banks over invested in bought securities 
(ABS, CDS etc) and funded these new assets in inter bank deposit markets. Commercial 
banks did much the same with their existing wholesale banking and investment banking 
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operations. Bankers in the failing banks did not appreciate how retail, wholesale and 
investment forms of banks together created new risks for each component of the organisation. 
They appeared to pay only ‘lip service’ to prior knowledge of internal risk management as 
they exclusively pursued growth, profits and bonuses.  Thus, the weaknesses in both business 
and product valuation models played a significant role in contributing to weaknesses in 
markets.  Other banks had been much more cautious as they moved out their traditional 
commercial bank or investment bank models towards the UB model. Their slower rate of 
growth and adaptation to new areas meant that their learning was at a higher rate than the 
environmental change (in banking, in inter-bank markets, in bank products). Their learning 
was more closely focussed on core areas of bank organisation, intermediation and risk 
management and as a result their bank models were more robust during the 2008-09 crisis 
than those of the failing banks. 
 
Problems of knowledge and understanding in markets 
By early 2007, some international bankers appeared to have had a major memory or 
understanding lapse concerning market problems. They ignored prior knowledge of previous 
crises in banking markets (Kindleberger,1996) whereby weaknesses in lending and a heavy 
reliance on markets for liquidity interacted with market problems of confidence to trigger a 
financial crisis. Even though asset based securities and credit default swaps had been believed 
to be diversified across different banks, countries, and economies, the crisis in 2007-09 
revealed that both sides of the balance sheet remained fully exposed to the same source of risk 
– primarily the US property market. Both asset and liability sides of bank balance sheets also 
faced common risks based on structural problems in the inter bank chains or networks trading 
in the complex new securities. The principal-agent model was severely weakened as high 
information asymmetries and conflicts of interest between members of these networks (bank 
issuers, bank advisors and rating agencies) compromised valuation standards in security 
issues. Indeed, limited understanding of the complex products, poor monitoring on the chain, 
and a combination of blind faith buttressed by overly optimistic quality ratings, meant that 
risk was not understood or monitored and end purchasers were sold very risky low quality 
assets masquerading as high quality and low risk. 
 
An important feature of the 2007-09 crisis was its global nature, and this constrained and 
limited the effectiveness of individual country responses. European central banks and the 
Bank of England had to act within EU regulations and could not, as in previous crises, act 
quickly in private.  A key factor this time was the 24 hour ‘gaze’ and connectivity of the 
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global media and financial markets which ensured that as historic problems were repeated 
they were no longer allowed to remain private.  Bankers and regulators had far less time to 
respond to events and those without an understanding of previous crises and of  UB problems 
were even less prepared to deal with the 2007-09 crisis than previous crises. 
 
2.3 Banking vulnerabilities revealed by the Crisis 
As the crisis broke,  knowledge problems and  historic UB problems combined. In part they 
all contributed to new  financial intermediation problems of assets deteriorating rapidly in 
quality under stress, of fragile and disappearing liquidity, and  of low (inadequate) levels of 
equity capital. The pre-existing knowledge problems also contributed to new information 
intermediation problems that severely injured  investment bank reputations for strict (security) 
valuation standards, for close monitoring of the sale of securities, and for working in the 
interests of ultimate investors.   
 
The Lehmans failure on September 16th 2008 immediately struck at existing weaknesses in 
intermediation processes in key banks, in their market positions, and in market risk spreading 
capabilities. Isolated pockets of weakness were connected, creating systemic fault-lines that 
seriously impacted all banks and markets.  Bank and market weaknesses interacted to produce 
a major negative spiral of declining confidence that led to inter bank market freezes,  further 
bank failures, and bailouts. These interactions and the prior problems all intensified and led  
to the full blown financial crisis in October 2008.  As confidence in the financial system and 
its regulators collapsed, a credit freeze began, consumer confidence fell, real business 
transactions declined and a major recession hit the world economy in 2009.  
 
The Lehmans failure corresponded to Weick’s (1988) idea of a ‘cosmology episode’, which 
arises when individuals, teams, organisations, and markets suddenly feel that the universe is 
no longer a rational, orderly system. What made the failure of Lehman so disturbing and 
shocking was that key players in failing banks suffered both from this catastrophic event and, 
simultaneously lost the means to recover from it.  As Coutu (2003) remarked. ‘A person feels 
like he has never been here before, has no idea of where he is, and has no idea who can help 
him. An inevitable state of panic ensues, and the individual becomes more and more anxious 
until he finds it almost impossible to make sense of what is happening to him’. Banks with 
more conservative transaction policies and clearer understanding of bank intermediation and 
risk appeared to have had lower exposure to and were less vulnerable to such a ‘cosmology 
episode’.  They were better prepared to act during the crisis and were not transfixed and made 
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immobile by it. They had learnt enough to avoid the major risks, but were also in a position to 
profit from the failing banks by purchasing bank functions or whole banks to further develop 
their own UB model. 
 
The 2009 events follow closely Kindleberger’s (1996) model of the causes and sequence of 
many past financial crises. A boom, initially triggered by innovation and/or irrational 
speculation which, with the aid of high leverage, raises asset prices until they are significantly 
overpriced, certainly captures the main elements of the property asset bubble from 2004 to 
2007. The revelation in 2007 that US property values were rapidly declining had such a 
massive negative impact on the securities based on US mortgages, that many securities could 
not be valued by large international banks.  This coupled with the Bear Stern and Lehman 
failures in 2008, combined with the fragility of the banking system, led to the final, crisis and 
panic, stages; the bursting of the bubble, the rush for liquidity, and the subsequent credit 
squeeze. 
 
3. Developing a conceptual frame for knowledge creation and use in banks. 
 
In this section a more general theoretical approach to understanding the role of learning, 
knowledge creation and use in banking is developed. This conceptual frame is based, in part, 
on existing developments in UB practice (Holland, 2009), and in part, on developments in the 
literature concerning the ‘learning organisation’, knowledge management,  ‘intellectual 
capital’, and knowledge based competitive advantage.  Working examples of these theoretical 
ideas are discussed as they are connected to each other and to conventional ideas of bank 
intermediation and risk management functions. 
 
There is much evidence for active learning by banks. Retail banks were the outcome of much 
learning (through crisis, failure, error, fraud etc) over at least 300 years. Banks have not 
historically been good at learning and at exploiting prior lessons during periods of stability. 
Much learning has arisen during bank crises and subsequent regulation based on best practice. 
Harris (2002) provides evidence that learning from past mistakes, or even building upon past 
successes, continues to be the exception rather than the rule. The wholesale bank was 
developed, mainly in London, since the late 1940s and drew from existing practices in New 
York and London (Lewis and Davies, Ch4, 1987).  UB development during 1980-2006  was a 
live social and economic experiment as bankers tried to find an effective organisational 
solution to UB problems. Evolutionary processes such as competition and crises  have also 
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been at work (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and have combined with bank learning and strategic 
choices in driving bank change.  
 
It appears that UB problems of expansion, integration, and reorganising around markets were 
too difficult to solve via a priori reasoning before the event (Holland, 2009). Banks had to 
learn about these problems and their solutions via direct actions and transactions and via a 
strategy of active bank development. Learning arose via an iterative feedback process during 
active internal change and external transacting and associated errors, failures and successes, 
rather than through a rational ordered decision process.  The events of 2007-09 suggest that 
processes of learning and knowledge use now have to become formal, explicit, and 
benchmarked against best practice. A small number of banks have gone public on their 
knowledge management  and ‘learning’ organisation approaches. Holland (2009) also points 
out that despite many UB problems of development and learning over 1980-2006 in 
individual banks, some patterns of organised learning can be discerned across a wider set of  
case UBs. Such evidence provides practical support for a more detailed analysis of the idea of 
the bank as a ‘learning’ organisation, and of the role of knowledge in bank intermediation, 
risk management and hence  bank competitive advantage. These insights are then used to 
focus the discussion regarding how banks can formally learn and actively create knowledge in 
a dynamic process through time. 
 
3.1 Case examples of Banks as ‘Learning organisations’ and knowledge management 
 
Banks such as HSBC provided a knowledge based response to the 2007-09 financial crisis 
and proved more robust than failing banks. The survival of banks such as HSBC, can be 
attributed in part to their more cautious approaches to the development of the UB. It can also 
be explained by their explicit policies to develop knowledge and to implement it at all levels 
in the bank businesses. Scandinavian banks such as Swedbank have also implemented similar 
policies to develop and implement knowledge and the Swedbank case provides further 
insights here. 
 
Staffan Ivarsson (2003), deputy director of Swedbank human resources, has provided many 
insights into banks as ‘learning organisations’.  
‘A central management enabler for Swedbank is its “Tool of the Future,” a sophisticated 
economic model based on human capital, market capital and profitability, backed up by years 
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of data collected and regularly analyzed, profiling its people, leadership, customers and 
business processes.  
The management model …is based on the following three corner-stones: 
• The traditional aspects of profitability, i.e. volume, revenue, etc. 
• Human Capital, i.e. organisation and employees. 
• Market Capital, centring on customers and customer loyalty. 
…Swedbank developed its Tool of the Future in 1992 …..They started with the fundamental 
belief that the skills, motivation and satisfaction of their employees would be instrumental 
drivers of value for customers, which would in turn drive overall performance for the bank 
and especially profitability. First developing measures and then linking those through an 
economic model—human capital, market capital and profitability—became the Tool of the 
Future. …….The process began with surveys in every branch and among all employees, 
measuring such things as leadership, “businessmanship,” competence, internal support, etc. 
In parallel, Swedbank surveyed its customers on various dimensions measuring satisfaction 
and value. Both sets of measures were then matched with profitability and other financial 
measures, such as growth, profit per customer, revenue versus cost ratios, etc. The process 
yielded insight-producing distributions among all branches based on correlations between 
human capital resources and market capital, shining light on the performance of individual 
branches as well as on groups of banks that served particular markets. ….The key is 
understanding the economics of the human capital and human interactions and how those can 
be changed for the better.”   …….But  Ivarsson,  also noted, ‘….I have doubts that IC will 
ever become a separate balance sheet item.  The reason is that companies are extremely 
different. Therefore, separate tools would be  needed to measure each company’s IC. It is 
difficult to devise a common formula to cover both banks and the manufacturing industry. I 
thus believe that each company – the few companies that actually do report on Human 
Capital – will continue to present their Human Capital reporting in their own way  …..As 
Swedbank continues to build its database, its analyses and understanding of the dynamic 
interplay between human capital, customers and profitability only becomes more 
sophisticated and useful..’ …Finally, the  whole effort required a comprehensive learning 
management platform that could support a systematic and holistic approach toward learning 
and competency management, while reducing risks of increased costs  generated by the need 
to train more people and deliver more training days.’ 
 
Bontis (1996) refers to a firm’s knowledge management activities as acquiring, storing, 
disseminating and retrieval of intellectual resources throughout the organisation. This is 
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illustrated by the HSBC case. Ellis (2003) reported on HSBC’s successes and problems with 
knowledge management (KM) and learning. 
‘Knowledge-acquisition projects (Kaps) continue to be used to effectively download 
experience and wisdom from ‘old heads’ before they leave the business, into an accessible 
database format so that our organisational memory remains current and fresh. …I believe 
that the success of Kaps is down to one thing: the desire that people – particularly, it would 
appear, wise old hands – have to tell their story. In an organisation as vast as HSBC, the very 
act of asking a senior person to ‘download’ the nuggets of learning they have picked up 
during their often outstanding careers makes them feel valued. And if that were not enough, it 
might actually help those left in the organisation to learn faster….On a negative side, the unit 
was unable to translate the sparkling array of KM tools and techniques into sufficiently well-
understood concepts that the conservative (although some might say overtly cynical) culture 
of a traditional organisation could grasp. In particular, efforts to instil a need for intellectual-
capital measurement and reporting fell on deaf ears, with most executives believing they had 
enough to measure already.... the pressure felt in most commercial organisations to deliver or 
achieve beneficial results this quarter, not in three years’ time, is a real impediment to large-
scale KM projects where the gestation time can typically be three to five years. ‘ 
 
3.2 Dynamic creation of bank knowledge and capabilities  
 
Revans(1998) proposed a model of how learning  should occur in organisations. He argued 
that learning should be greater than or equal to the rate of change in the environment. If not, 
then the firm would be unable to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage.  This idea is 
clearly relevant to the core learning errors made by failing banks during the 2007-09 crisis 
and to bank specific mistakes in previous periods.  The development of intellectual capital in 
these banks did not keep up with the expansion of financial capital and associated risks. In 
addition, the historic problems and the crisis both made it clear that the focus of environment 
and bank learning was critical. Too much emphasis on learning about product growth and 
complexity and too little emphasis on learning about intermediation and risk consequences 
constituted a major failure in learning. Some failing banks (eg Bank of America) had 
sophisticated learning and knowledge management capabilities. However during the crisis 
they suffered from problems of  misplaced focus of knowledge and from poor top 
management leadership concerning learning, knowledge management and  knowledge use. 
 
 14
Since Revans (1998) there have been further  contributions to the  idea of the ’Learning 
organisation’ by Easterby-Smith et al (2000), and Morgan (1997) which provide clearer 
theoretical guidance for bankers and regulators.  Case banks in Holland (2009) had patterns 
of organised learning. They had internal organisation features suggesting they were ‘learning 
organisations’ as discussed in Pedler et al (1997). The banks ‘looked in’ and learnt about 
internal organisational order in the form of internal bank functions and processes and new 
combined intermediation processes. New order consisted of integrated corporate and 
consumer banking functions within the international bank. They looked in and learnt about 
bank M&A teams, corporate finance advice teams, finance raising teams and other functions, 
and how they worked together to produce joint products. The case companies also ‘looked 
out’ ( Pedler et al, 1997). and learnt about external order in networks, ‘tiers’, relationships, 
transaction channels and processes  in inter-bank, security, and derivative  markets. The banks 
‘looked out’ and sought to understand the corporate  bank markets for corporate advice to 
clients,  for M&A, for  equity and bonds financing. They learnt how to reorganize their new 
internal functions around financial and corporate/consumer markets to create a market driven 
and responsive organization. They learnt how to create adaptive networks and channels for 
transacting with other banks and customers. They ‘looked out’ and learnt about the larger City 
of London institutional setting in which these networks, channels and processes existed.  
 
The banks also learnt within this internal and external order. They learnt how to act in 
decision processes in these ordered and comprehensible contexts. They learnt about new 
composite bank products, how to produce and price them, how to spread and share risk across 
different forms of bank risk management processes and  intermediation (on and off balance 
sheet). They used external networks and relationship in markets to learn, how to transact in 
markets, and how to spread and share transaction risk across different markets. They used 
these to learn and create information and knowledge advantages concerning the 
corporate/consumer market and financial/inter-bank markets. Learning also involved 
developing the new banking skills required in individuals and teams operating within the new 
expanded internal functions, external networks and markets, and the skills to integrate these 
functions and activities.  
 
In Morgan’s (1997, p90) terms, the employees, top management and boards of the UB learnt 
about their uncertain environment made up of markets for deposits, loans, payments 
services, securities and derivatives. They scanned this environment to anticipate change, and 
to detect significant variations. They purposefully learnt about how the bank interacted with 
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this uncertain banking environment and how their actions (funding, lending, risk 
management, etc) changed external conditions. They developed an ability to question this 
environment and to change their norms and assumptions. They learnt that they had to 
maintain a continuous purposeful interactive process with, and set of actions in, this 
environment. These were designed to alter an influential part of the environment in a desired 
direction. Uzzi et al (2003), investigated learning in (bank lending and debt) markets between 
banks and firms. Bank-firm relationships formed networks and these shaped knowledge 
transfer and learning processes by creating the opportunities for knowledge trade and 
reducing the learning risks. In Morgan’s terms (p90, 1997) the UBs learnt that they had to 
develop well informed and flexible response mechanisms within the organisation to achieve 
their aims concerning the banking environment. They allowed an appropriate strategic 
direction and pattern of organisation for bank strategic decisions making, for back office 
functions, for customer facing technology and intangibles, and for bank operational decisions 
to emerge. Similar learning and well informed response mechanisms arose at the boundary 
and outside the bank to achieve their aims. Such bank learning and strategic choices 
combined with evolutionary and competitive processes (Nelson and Winter, 1982) in driving 
bank change. 
 
In achieving these learning aims banks ‘learnt how to learn’ and thus avoided getting trapped 
in simple environmental response systems based on defensive organisational routines. In 
Teece et al (1997) terms they had developed ‘dynamic capabilities’ as competitive 
advantages to deal with rapid and unexpected change or as “the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments” (Teece et al., 1997: 516).  In contrast to these patterns, there were many 
examples of mistakes and errors in individual bank learning and knowledge use. Learning in 
individual banks was not as systematic as the above multi case patterns suggested and arose 
via an iterative feedback process during errors, failures and successes.   
 
3.3 The nature of bank knowledge and its role in intermediation  
 
The learning process played a critical role in developing new bank knowledge or ‘intellectual 
capital’ (IC). This existed formally in the case banks' training manuals and information 
systems and informally in the experience and cognitive skills of bankers and external parties.  
This knowledge was constantly refreshed by new experiences and information on clients and 
their industries and by active financial market trading.  
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 Literature on intellectual capital categorises the major types of knowledge used within the 
firm and its markets. The three major elements of IC: human capital, structural capital and 
relational capital (Meritum model (2001, p. 63) allow a holistic view of a company’s value-
creating resources to be constructed. In banking, human capital was interpreted as  knowledge 
employed during funding, lending, risk management decisions and in wider intermediation 
processes. Structural capital was internal context knowledge, and relational capital was 
external context knowledge both influencing decision processes. Prior knowledge of how 
intermediation worked, how risk should be managed, and how markets worked and failed, 
was incorporated in IC, with this being matched to previous crises and previous variations in 
the economic cycle. 
 
“Human capital includes the knowledge, skills, experiences and ability of people.” Meritum 
model (2001, p. 63). The UB contained much in the way of human capital used in decision 
and intermediation processes. Human capital (HC) was present and employed within both 
internal processes/decisions and in market processes/decisions and hence in intermediation.  
“Structural capital .. comprises the organizational routines, procedures, systems, 
cultures,databases, etc. “  Meritum model (2001, p. 63). Holland (2009) illustrates how the 
UB also contained  much  structural  knowledge (SC) of internal and market 
structures/processes/decisions. Knowledge built into these mechanisms and structures help 
bank employees perform their decision tasks and make use of their own human capital in the 
pursuit of bank  performance.  “Relational capital …comprises that part of Human and 
Structural Capital involved with the companies relations with stakeholders (investors 
,creditors, customers, suppliers, etc.) plus the perceptions that they hold about the company”  
Meritum model (2001, p. 63): The UB contained much  Relational and market capital (RC), in 
the form of close corporate relations and reputation. 
 
Banks learnt that intellectual capital had a direct impact on decision processes and on wider 
intermediation processes. High quality bank IC was used to interpret new information and 
events as they arose as well as providing the context within which to assess the significance 
and meaning of externally supplied information. This reduced the transaction costs (search, 
monitor, verify, evaluate) of various banking transactions with customers, when banks were 
intermediating between these customers and transactions on both asset and liability sides of 
the balance sheet. Knowledge as HC, SC and RC was the means to exploit new synergies  
such as a joint client base and stronger capital backing across a larger number of syndicated 
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loans, asset based securities and other financial assets. A combination of investment and 
commercial bank client knowledge bases and relations was used to make broader use of tiers 
and reputation when transacting in inter bank markets. This also increased opportunities for 
diversification and for arbitrage, matching, and for mismatching. The use of broader corporate  
and inter-bank relations and their associated knowledge attributes were expected to stabilise 
expected income and to narrow the variance of income, via economies of scale and scope, by 
making it easier to forecast transaction flow. The joint exploitation of enhanced market tiers, 
and company relations  was also expected to improve intermediation and to stabilize supply 
and demand and profit margins all across market cycles. In contrast to the above expectations, 
major systematic risks arose in the investment and wholesale banking arms of failing UBs. 
Extreme mismatching and intensive arbitrage activities, pushed intermediation to its limits 
and destroyed much of the expected transaction cost reduction and diversification benefits in 
the UB. 
 
3.4 Resource based view – a theoretical view of the role of knowledge in bank advantage 
 
The above analysis makes it clear that bank knowledge and learning are at the heart of 
effective bank intermediation and of a sustainable competitive advantage (SCA). Fahy (2000) 
used the resource based view of the firm (RBV) to discuss the nature of resources required to 
create a SCA. He proposed that resources are comprised of three groups, namely tangible 
assets, intangible assets and capabilities. These groups have “differing characteristics of 
value, barriers to duplication and appropriability for the firm” (Clulow et al., 2003, p.222).   
 
In the RBV, well established tangibles and tangible processes in banking such as buildings, 
trading floors, branches, ATMs, data bases, and intermediation processes were easily 
duplicated. Intermediation processes, as  core tangible risk and return generation ‘machines’ 
available to all banks, would not normally be considered sources of competitive advantage. 
Intellectual property, brand, and networks are examples of intangible assets which are held by 
many firms (Fahy, 2000; Clulow et al., 2003; Hall, 1993). In the case of banks, the RBV 
would expect that intangibles and their impact on tangibles (especially intermediation) would 
be the primary source of sustainable competitive advantage and success in banking. These 
could include, inter alia, lending skills, debtor management skills, routines for risk 
management, and security issue and placing skills and routines. Reputation and brand names 
are key intangibles for banks in that they may promote loyalty and help firms to attract 
customers from competitors (Clulow et al., 2003).  Intangibles include  bank-bank relations, 
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bank-company relations, bank-consumer relations, and knowledge of customer behaviour 
within the context of relations. Such knowledge intensive intangibles and resources can create 
barriers to duplication as they are imitable, immobile and have no substitute (Clulow et al., 
2003) and contribute to  confidence upon which banking success and failure depends 
 
The RBV theory also predicts failure and high vulnerability to financial crisis. The bank that 
does not have key resources such as tangibles, intangibles and capabilities, faces major 
competitive disadvantages and is vulnerable to failure. The bank that does not have key 
resources with characteristics such as value, inimitability, appropriability, and barriers to 
duplication, is also vulnerable to failure.  This was borne out during the 2007-09 crisis, 
whereby some failing banks undermined tangible intermediation processes as they sought 
competitive advantage through innovation in new products and inter bank trading, and new 
ways of manipulating their core intermediation models.  Before the crisis broke, this created a 
highly exposed bank, with major weakness in its financial intermediation processes. The same 
factors were at play in creating weakness in information intermediation as failing banks over 
exploited their reputations for strict valuation, for close monitoring of securities, and for 
working in the interests of ultimate investors.  
 
Top management weaknesses in the failing banks were important in undermining bank SCA 
and increasing  relative vulnerability to crisis. Top management weakened other key resources 
such as risk management skills at middle management and operational levels by downplaying 
relevant knowledge. They appeared not to have had an explicit strategy to develop human 
capital, structural capital and relational capital at all levels in the bank or how to use it to 
improve risk control and intermediation. They downplayed ideas of adequate equity, and of 
sufficient cash. They sought to gain the maximum benefits of leverage ignoring the impact on 
bank functions and risk exposure. Senior bankers in the failing banks were seemingly 
beguiled by mathematical models that purported to value the complex securitised assets they 
were creating and trading.  They were also seduced by theories of external risk spreading and 
diversification in markets and by theories of market efficiency, ideas actively propagated at 
middle management and operational levels to the detriment of ‘basics’ in risk management. 
These created a competitive disadvantage relative to those banks that had been more cautious 
in pursuing their development of the UB model.  The failing bankers pushed conventional 
ideas of intermediation to their effective working limits and thereby undermined these core 
tangible processes. They also undermined key associated intangibles, especially knowledge 
and its role in understanding and exploiting intermediation processes, markets, and 
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transactions. Thus problems with top management were at the heart of the failing banks 
problems. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
The core idea of this paper is that knowledge and lack of it amongst key players (board and 
top management) at the top of failing banks was deeply implicated in the 2007-09 crisis and 
addressing these issues needs be part of the solution to this crisis. The failing banks neither 
applied existing knowledge nor created new knowledge to deal adequately with the new 
issues that arose in relation to their new business models.  The paper has explored how these 
problems can be resolved in part by an active approach to learning and knowledge creation in 
banks. This is guided by a new conceptual frame  based, in part, on existing developments in 
universal banking (UB) practice (Holland, 2009), and in part, on developments in the 
theoretical literature. Working examples of these theoretical ideas are  discussed as they are 
connected to each other and  conventional ideas of bank intermediation and risk management. 
 
Knowledge alone will not solve the problems outlined. The active involvement of bank top 
management and the board and the exercise of their power on these knowledge  matters is 
vital. Given the history of bank learning, incentives to learn and to implement knowledge 
effectively are only likely to arise at the top of banks with clear regulation and tough 
sanctions.  It is difficult to conceive of how such learning,  knowledge  and regulation can 
control or change human nature, especially greed. However, they can play a role in limiting 
these problems by ensuring that Board and top management know and are formally 
responsible for dealing with the  issues.  
 
The conceptual framework provides bankers and regulators with a coherent means to think 
about policy. This paper argues that banks must prioritise knowledge of bank intermediation 
and risk management over knowledge of growth and strategy. Improved accountability for 
bank boards and top management has to be based on higher levels of their knowledge and 
competence. Improved delivery of core bank functions of raising finance, and  management of 
risk has to be based on higher levels of bank wide knowledge. The writing of ‘living wills’ for 
banks has to be based on clearly  understood models of banks.  Control over the bonus culture 
has to involve the recognition that bank wide knowledge attributes are central to overall bank 
performance and it is not just based on ‘scarce’ individuals who demand extreme pay and 
bonuses (Myners, 2009). Problems of optimism and  excess opportunism, have to be 
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controlled by relating this behaviour to higher understanding of core bank functions and 
objectives. Extensive  market  trading and securitization has to be controlled through risk 
management knowledge, skills and actions.  High leverage has to be  challenged by higher 
status of ( knowledge of ) intermediation models.  
 
An immediate and practical solution to the problems faced by bankers and other key players 
in the system would for governments and regulators to use the above analysis and framework 
to change the way they think about bank regulation. Instead of just focussing on conventional 
regulation issues concerning bank structure and legal form, prudential bank management, 
bank conduct with customers, bank risk management, or bank systemic risks, they should also 
turn their attention to bank learning and knowledge use. Practical action arising from the 
2007-09 crisis may necessitate governments to legislate for demonstrated competence and 
understanding throughout the bank hierarchy, though especially at the board and top 
management levels, and in their ability to monitor knowledge use at middle management and 
operational levels. The regulator could make formal and explicit statements regarding core 
intermediation and risk management models and skills and competences required at various 
bank hierarchy levels to ensure these ideas were implemented. These could cover specialist 
and combined banks and make explicit the role of learning and knowledge based intangibles 
in boosting the effectiveness of intermediation and risk management.   
 
This proposal makes it clear that it is not the form of bank alone that is essential to effective 
and safe banks. Bringing forward new Glass Steagall Acts to reform the bank types  allowed 
is not necessarily the dominant issue especially if the knowledge problems of combined 
intermediation and risk management can be solved through learning.   The use of knowledge 
on how to organise and integrate specialist banks and intermediation, and how to avoid risk 
contagion across a bank is essential.  Banks with a variety of structural combinations, must 
have the ability to learn and create new knowledge such that whatever form the bank takes it 
can adapt and respond to rapid change and crisis.  This knowledge would provide the basis to 
licence banks (and bankers), with the possibility of licence withdrawal the sanction for 
inadequate provision.  Board agendas would include formal requirements to assess risk and 
risk management knowledge according to regulator standards, and board would be 
responsible for risks taken. 
 
Quinn (2009) argued that existing law on fiduciary duty of directors could be the basis to 
require board members to demonstrate their knowledge of how banks are organised, how they 
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work as intermediaries, of risk management, and of the nature of key financial products. The 
same legal duty could be the basis for directors to oversee ‘good practice’ in bank learning, 
knowledge creation and in training standards.  Corporate governance guidance could be the 
means to raise the knowledge of bank boards to ensure that they ask the same questions of top 
management and other key decision makers in middle management. Similar comments could 
be made about auditors, credit rating agencies, and regulators.  
 
Akerlof and Schiller (2009), argued that there are limits to knowledge in a world of ‘animal 
spirits’ where individual and group psychological states and fashion in markets vary through 
time. Bank boards and top management can also be captured by these events. If, as Akerlof 
and Schiller (2009) suggest,  new ideas and new psychological states spread like a new virus 
contagion or pandemic in a population without immunity, then this paper argues that part of 
the solution must lie with  ‘immunization’ through prior knowledge and continuous learning. 
The transmission of stories through such contagion must be tested by deeper and more widely 
diffused  knowledge at the point of story transfer. ‘Immunization’ through learning and 
knowledge use must take effect at top management, middle management, and operational 
levels in banks.  Incentives to ignore knowledge and prior lessons,  and  encourage volatile 
inter bank market conditions, must also be removed by reforming bonus systems.  
 
The solution must also lie with active learning through change to create a more informed, 
knowledgeable, robust, responsive banking and market system.  Managing ‘animal spirits’  
also requires governments, regulators, bankers, shareholders, and auditors  to actively learn 
and become continuously informed by robust, knowledge based  models of banks,  products. 
and markets. Regulatory intervention must lie in insisting that all the key players improve, 
agree, and act on this knowledge.  If  regulators can observe bank learning then it would 
create a unique knowledge base essential for fulfilling their role. Regulator learning  
possibilities here were revealed by the FSA during the production of  the Turner report (2009) 
and  by Bank of England scenario building and stress testing of bank models in 2004-09. Such 
processes and outcomes have to be made public if banks and regulators are to make a robust 
response to future problems and crises. Such learning arose during the fundamental debate in 
2007-09 when the nature of finance capitalism was being challenged. This may lead to more 
systematic changes in structures, and processes in banks, markets and regulation. It may  lead 
to further advances whereby a wider range of social sciences, especially the human and 
psychology centred sciences and theories of learning and knowledge, becoming more central 
to conventional knowledge of banks and their roles in markets.    
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